1. 1. Systematics and Law
One of the principal purposes of science is to create order, and a crucial tool in this pursuit is systematics. Knowledge lives in structures. Science creates structures. We speak of systematics and systematizing. Science would be an odd phenomenon indeed without systematics.
Systematizing is an essential process. It indicates the relative importance of the things considered – their social and scientific importance.. It also provides us with a means to distinguish different degrees and types of expertise. In our increasingly complex society and ever more divers knowledge environment, systematization is part of quality assurance. After all, where information management is concerned, our capabilities as human beings are demonstrably limited.
In Law, systematics is also a significant factor in interpretation. We use the frameworks available to us in the component disciplines of Law to construct subsystems. These have an influence on the kinds of interpretations science puts forward. We refer to this as systematic interpretation, and it helps us avoid haphazard actions and allows us to test the positions that have been presented. In this respect, systematics serves to constrain the power typically exercised by experts and authority.
It is thus natural for us to work within the bounds of a systematics. Given the function of science, this assertion is beyond dispute. Science serves society. But a systematic can also be risky, even severely detrimental. If is not renewed, science begins to become detached from society; it ascribes itself an absolute value. It no longer fulfills the criteria for science. What we end up with is pseudoscience.
There are many reasons why systematics fail to change. Some have to do with the individuals involved. Resistance to change is a familiar phenomenon even in scientific circles. Given the strong focus on the individual in the world of scholarship, a single professor of law adhering to to the old systematics is enough to hold back progress for decades. Academic freedom has its price.
A second significant reason why science is so static lies in bureaucracy. Teaching and research at the university level has a distinctive bureaucratic tinge to it. This applies equally to public and private universities. In an address delivered upon his appointment as professor, Danish scholar Peter Blume spoke of a subject imperialism that was impedes progress. This is well put. Despite its role in society, a university is a conservative community. Scientific standard are easily compromised when the different subject compete with one another for recognition. We have seen evidence of this here in Lapland, too, when trying to reform the curriculum.
Even where science is not subject to outside influences, it must deal with the volatility of social development. Few were able to anticipate the coming of the Information Society. Finnish Professor of Communication, Osmo A. Wiio, was one scholar to do so, in the late 1960s. But one swallow does not make a summer. The academic world – Law included – was painfully slow to notice the Information Society. This should not be forgotten when we talk about Information Law as a new field in the discipline of Law.
2. Information law as one of the legal science
2.1 The family of legal sciences
There are many legal sciences. We speak of the family of legal sciences. Systematization has made quite a bit of progress if we recall that just a few decades ago we only had a handful of legal sciences. On factor contributing to this development is juridification. More and more of the phenomena in our lives are regulated. In the European context alone, we distinguish over 60 fields within the discipline of Law; and that is a lot.
We see Information Law more frequently – and assertively – counting itself among these 60. Then again, the field has a long history. Herbert Fiedler was one of the first to introduce it back in the early 1970s. At that time, we were going through the initial stages in the development of two new institutions: administrative automation and personal data protection were making their appearance on the legal scene, and brought with them a number of legal problems – problems in understanding, interpreting and drafting.
Later, the well-known Norwegian pioneer in Legal Informatics Jon Bing created the conceptual foundation for Information Law in his 1981 article “Information Law?” He linked the topic to the new issues that had been raised by the development of information technology
To Bing, Information Law at the time was a interdisciplinary and heterogeneous area of research but one that was essential. At the same time, the term itself “Information Law” served as a slogan that was to have awakened lawyers to the problematic nature of the relationship between IT and Law.
It is essential that we mention the early works of Bing and Fiedler when we talk about Information Law today. They are valuable accounts of the time before the present Network Society. Yet any systematics is – and should be – always bound to society as well. This means we would do well to ask: What is Information Law like in the Network Society? It is still a slogan that helps us see the problematic relation between Law and IT?
Yes, yes it is still a slogan today. A significant percentage of today’s practicing lawyers were educated when the Information Society in its infancy. Moreover, there are always many different strata within the legal profession in terms of background knowledge. Among its other functions, legal systematics is a form of communication for lawyers and legal stakeholders such as administrative professional. This is one reason why we need effective slogans.
But mere slogans are not going to be enough. What we have to do is to examine the core issues of Information Law more deeply in their social context – a society that is heavily dependent on data, information and information networks. What we are witnessing is not just a new technical phenomenon – such as the telephone in its day – prompting new questions of interpretation and regulation; in essence these can be solved without significant changes in our systematics. New technology does not necessarily entail anything terribly new in legal terms legally or it is easily adapted to existing frameworks.
It is also often thought that the increase in the amount of legislation is directly linked to systematization. If we think about specialization, this would seem to be the case to a certain extent. But it would be very misleading to generalize here. Increased legislation is only one factor when assessing the need to rethink our systematization.
And it is also a dangerous factor: It causes us to concentrate on the legislation itself, making it easy for us to forget the change that prompted that legislation in the first place. Systematization cannot be merely the cutting up of legislative material into convenient, manageable chunks. To be sure, it may seem like a good method at first, but it will gradually reveal its shortcomings. The analogy of exchanging an SLR (single-lens reflex) camera for an instamatic suggests itself here. Quality declines.
With these reservations in mind, I would like to go on to take a closer look to what seem to be persistent problems in perceiving the relationship between law and information.
2.2. The focus of Law and a field of Law
We can start here with the age-old theoretical consideration of whether law has in fact an object. For example, some have questioned the idea that an author has copyright in his or her work. There has been a tendency to see rights as relationships between people and organizations. One would then be speaking metaphysically if one spoke of objects of law. This view is worth stressing. It is dangerous to objectify rights. But in normal usage and in legislation as well it is established practice to speak of rights as being associated with to phenomena and objects. There is nothing particularly blameworthy here, if only we remember the constraints on objectifying rights.
We can thus speak of Information Law as a field that, in general terms, is concerned with information. It is a good slogan. But it is no solution. We have done no more than find a catchy name.
Information Law is a much better term than law and information. The latter brings to mind a special interdisciplinary enterprise along the lines of law and literature or law and economics. May combination with “law and” have a decidedly bad reputation in the eyes of practicing lawyers. The famous of Harry T. Edwards denunciations of the excess of “law and” subjects in American legal education reflect a more general mentality, one that can only be changed very slowly, however.
Looking at things in opposite perspective, one should point out that every field of Law has its essential interfaces with together disciplines. Good Law is generally also dialogue with other sciences. Law from which other sciences have been expunged is an odd phenomenon indeed, although this is what part of the conventional, theory-shirking doctrine of interpretation jurisprudence has aspired to. It is dangerous for the discipline, and for society.
If and when we say that Information Law is a field whose focus is information and which interacts with data processing and the information sciences we have found a practical description for Information Law, But it will not suffice. It is too general, too vulnerable. Following Peter Seipel, we could criticize the description by pointing out that it is hard to find anything in Law that does not have to do with information in one way or another.
Seipel is no doubt correct here. Information and Law are linked to one another in a wide variety of way. A closer look at information-related regulation suggests a rough six-fold classification of relevant provisions: those that are information-dependent; those applying to information-based products; those pertaining to communication; those relating to the individual; those concerned with public information; and, finally, those that are connected with the information infrastructure. For example, provisions related to form are typical information-dependent provisions. This classification is not meant to be exhaustive.
This elementary breakdown alone shows that it would be extraordinarily difficult to create a fixed, traditional legal systematics such as that found in family Law or Property Law. It would be far too elaborate and thus inapplicable in a static systematics that distinguishes bodies of provisions. And this has been the nature of traditional legal systematics.
What is often touted as the opposite of Law based on static systematics is[problem-based Law. This is a Law that goes beyond established system boundaries. Is this then the key to the development of Information Law?
My answer is “no”, a very categorical “no”. Information is not a problem as defined by problem-centered Law, i.e., something whose study requires the crossing of system boundaries. Not at all.
What we are dealing with is a structural factor that in a new way has become a significant factor in the development of society. The social debate we engage in as lawyers requires us to examine the dependency of individuals, communities and society itself, as well as the related rights and obligations and benefits and risks. One consequence of this is the continued brisk development of legal regulation of the Network Society. We no longer speak of the proliferation of data processing or the growth in the amount of information.
In the Network Society we find ourselves working within a new information infrastructure and processing data and information in a new way. Our operational environment has changed. And, at the end of the day, we must note that our basic rights have, at least in part, already been transferred to information networks and that this process continues. Our privacy and our identity are exposed to new types of risks every time we make use of information networks.
These changes should prompt us to re-examine the position of information in society from the point of view of the discipline of Law as well. The importance of Information Law today derives from the significant change taking place in society. And it is here, I dare say, that we find the difference compared to earlier descriptions of Information Law. At the time, the Information Society was a distant utopia.
2.3. The principles of Information Law
Not even social change is good enough reason for setting up a new field of research, however. We should, of course, be able to justify the field in scientific terms. A need to be familiar with law and IT is not in itself adequate justification. The need to educate computer lawyers is a different matter than changing a legal systematics.
In order to get beyond specialization as an argument for revising our systematics, things must be assessed in light of what we term general doctrines. If social change and the need to develop new doctrines coincide, we have a sound justification for a new field of Law.
When we speak of the general doctrines in Law we typically refer to legal principles. Today, in my view, we are fully justified in speaking about the central principles of Information Law. The foremost among these are the right to information, the right to communication, the freedom of information and of the transmission of information, individual’s right of self-determination with respect to information, and the right to data security.
Each of these principles is a metaright of sorts, that is moral, goal-oriented rights on the level of a social contract. Occasionally it is asserted that social contracts are manifested in the form of written basic rights. This idea has been put forward in an interesting way by Luigi Ferrajoli, for example. Basic rights are a link to social contracts.
Yet, this is not necessarily the case. For the most part, none of the principles of Information Law mentioned above is enshrined as such in express, direct provisions on the level of basic rights. Yet, they are clear background accounts of the regulation of human and basic rights, accounts which the conservative legislator has largely overlooked due to the rapid pace of change in society. A few words on each of these principles is in order here.
The right to know is a central freedom based on the prevailing concept of the human being. The individual has a genuine need and right to know and to use information. In order to use his or her right of self-determination in the constitutional state, individuals must have the right to information – the information that has been gathered on them, as well as information related to their culture and society. What we have here is the informational dimension of the right to self-determination. For these reasons, the legal order must be prepared to provide rights that safeguard the individual’s need for information – basic rights as well as others. This is why, for example, privacy and publicity in Finland are enshrined in the Constitution and, similarly, the Library Act is based on the idea of the right to know..
The right to communication, for its part, is a new basic metaright, or at least one that has come to the fore in a new way in the Network Society. It is not enough to speak of freedom of expression as a technology-neutral freedom and, for example, of the protection of confidential messages. Equally essential is the opportunity to use the new information infrastructure, now that the exercise and protection of our basic rights takes place in part on information networks. Modern communication on information networks naturally realizes our right to information but it is only one aspect of the issue. The right of the individual to communication on networks must also be safeguarded. It must be possible to use the new and essential infrastructure in an appropriate manner. This is why we are justified in including this question in the debate on legal principles that is taking place on the level of basic metarights. The so called digital divide is also depending on our access to open and other networks.
The principles of freedom of information and the free flow of information are central social principles where the functioning of democracy, culture and private economic life are concerned. Unlike other raw materials, information should – so the thinking goes – basically be freely available not only privately but also socially, communicationally, and commercially. It should also be possible to disseminate information; its free flow cannot be prevented through secrets or monopolies. Accordingly, the legal order has to be prepared to ensure the free flow of information through special rights, above all basic rights. In relation to public authority we also speak of openness in this context.
The right to data and information security is a basic condition for the functionality of the information infrastructure in the new Network Society. A democratic society and the constitutional state can only be built on information networks and digital information if the requisite data security exists to ensure the operation and use of this infrastructure. We should have a right to data and information security every bit as much as to other forms of security. We have been slow to realize this. In open information networks, data security has been primarily left to market forces and end users..
The informational right of self-determination is a basic element of the right of self-determination. As individuals we also have the right to be alone in society. Physical privacy is supplemented to an increasing extent in the Network Society by informational privacy. Our digital identities are also part of our right to self-determination. We basically have a right to retain control over information on us, to keep it confidential should we so wish, or to disseminate it in society. We can no doubt speak justifiably of an informational domestic peace of sorts. The interface between information and society is not merely a technical matter dictated by public authority’s criteria for what is appropriate. This is a crucial issue as we move towards electronic administration ja e-government.
In addition to the general principles of Information Law mentioned above, we can cite special legal principles that augment and realize these general principles. These include – at the very least – privacy, publicity, freedom of communication and the principle of public service. Where intellectual property rights are concerned, the ban on monopolies can also be seen as one of the principles in this group. All of these principles have – or should have – realizations on the level of legislation – norms that expressly support legal principles. And they all have links to other fields of Law.
I will leave my presentation of the central and supplementary principles of Information Law here. They would, they really would warrant a separate presentation. I believe the list I have presented is enough to convince the reader of the need for Information Law as a field of Law. In the Network Society, data, information, the information markets and information systems must be taken seriously in a new way. The complex path traveled by digital information begins with its attachment in some way to a particular platform and ends with its erasure or archiving. This is a risky road in technical terms. It is a rough course legally as well. We must both adapt old legal principles to the new environments and assess the need for new principles.
3. From a static to a dynamic systematics
In terms of a static, traditional systematics, what I have said above no doubt prompts the question what fields of Law might lose some of their objects of research to Information Law in the redistribution of legal sciences. The answer is simple – none, really. The question is ill formulated. The idea of Information Law as a field of Law in its own right is part of the shift to a dynamic systematics. The same issue can and should be examined from several different points of view.
This phenomenon is by no means a new one in Law. For example, it has long been the practice to assess questions of data protection as part of the law of personality and Information Law as part of Legal Informatics. The legal status of the patient has been assessed in terms of the law of personality, medical law and social law. There is no shortage of comparable examples.
The essential thing in a dynamic systematics is not that the same pieces of legislation become objects of interest for different fields within Law. This is common enough where static systematics is concerned. What is essential in dynamic systematics is the role of legal principles and social contracts.
The crux of this issue is what I have called the depth of sources in law. Conventional jurisprudence and frequently theoretical jurisprudence as well often adopt a narrow scope when they set out to find recommended interpretations and to systematize. They easily end up concentrating on other than the central legal principles. The bridge to basic rights either collapses or is wobbly at best. What we need to counteract this is a science of Law that recognizes the depth of sources of law and covers the range from a social contract to an individual situation calling for the interpretation of a law. With somewhat the same purpose in mind, Kaarlo Tuori has written in the Finnish legal literature about distinguishing between different levels of Law and about the deep structure of Law.
We are also accustomed to drawing a distinction between the general legal sciences – for example legal theory – and jurisprudence. This distinction is often presented in rather dichotomous terms. As Kaarle Makkonen has already noted, no clear boundary can be drawn between the general legal sciences and jurisprudence. But where the depth of sources is concerned, the distinction is a well-founded one. We need the general legal sciences to ensure the scientific nature of Law and to safeguard its mission of serving society.
In this perspective, Information Law can primarily be considered one of the general legal sciences. This is why it has been developed as part of Legal Informatics. Legal Informatics is like an elevator between a social contract and the different ways in which information is processed. Information Law is part of Legal Informatics and there is a social need for it as one of the increasingly independent general legal sciences. The scope of Information Law includes an examination of the processing of information and the transmission of information in the operational environment created by the new information infrastructure. But we are also producing dogmatics too. Data protection, electronic services in administration, digital signature and e-government are typical areas, where the elevator of information law is used at the level of interpretations too. We are not only discussing about principles.
4. Conclusion
Drahos and Braitwaite present us with an interesting perspective on the Information Society in their book The Feudalism of Information. The challenging nature of the title well describes the tensions that we have to deal with as the social significance of information and the information markets changes.
Technological, economic, administrative and legal convergence bring about not only significant changes in different activities but also – and perhaps most importantly – a growing shortage of know-how. New issues are addressed either through old tools or unbridled enthusiasm for the new. Equally problematic is our failure to notice changes in values. This is particularly familiar in the brief history of data protection. Our age is still marked by a significant deficit in know-how, despite the fact that data protection legislation has been in use here in Finland since the beginning of 1988.
The transition to the constitutional state has had an impact of its own on the practice and science of Law. The development of the Network Society has coincided with the development of the constitutional state. But, surprisingly, the direction of that development seems to be – a bit and even a lot – different. It seems to a considerable extent that the obligation to legislate that is part of the constitutional state is not being used to improve the position of the individual but to enact additional control and economic efficiency. Under such circumstances, the principles of Information Law are disregarded or at least compromised. This is easy enough to do if and when information and information systems continue to be considered as little more than aids.
When Wilhelm Steinmüller designed the first Legal Informatics curriculum at the beginning of the 1970s in Germany in terms of applied IT, he was farsighted enough to give due consideration to the importance of data processing systems. This perspective is important today as well. We live lives that are very much dependent on information systems. The planning of information systems requires legal planning. A lack of such planning jeopardizes democracy. This shortcoming takes on a critical role when government information systems are designed and brought on line. Here, too, I would like to emphasize that in the changing constitutional state we meet law ever earlier; law is more and more a planning science and the legal profession is required to work with other professions. This, too, is one aspect of safeguarding democracy.
But we must keep an eye on information itself to an equal extent. Its status has changed significantly during the last years.. Here, Thomas Hoeren’s recent idea of a special information justice as an extension of John Rawls’ justice debate becomes an important step forwards towards a more highly developed Information Law on the level of the general legal sciences. Information should not be made into a mere commodity.
You will no doubt permit me to conclude with an example of the impact of Information Law. If we think of the development of good government – a basis of government already mentioned in the law in Finland by name good administration – the primary way to develop the information systems needed in government is to make user friendly information systems available to citizens as part of the transition to electronic government. This is in fact required by law in Finland.
From the perspective of Information Law, however, the issue changes quite a bit. In addition to software that is user friendly we need openness in the systems. The citizen’s interest in information systems cannot end with the user interface. We have a right to know how public information is processed. This requires either open-source software or an adequate account of how the software used in public administration works. Neither of these goals has been grasped as yet in Finland. And yet we are proceeding headlong toward electronic government. From a legal perspective, that of Information Law, the development that lies ahead is nothing of short frightening.